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ABSTRACT 
This short piece aims to clarify, in the light of a comparative methodology, some 
aspects of the philosophical topology put forward by Gaston Bachelard in one of his 
final epistemological works, with the objective of making clear one of the many 
‘philosophical souls’ – to use an expression of Moritz Schlick – which can be found 
nestled in the sciences and in particular in the mathematical corpus of his time. At 
the same time, this piece aims to show how this need of a topology or topological 
reason finds analogy with that path of a more philosophical nature that characterized 
the final activities of Kurt Gödel in the 1950’s, as can be seen in his rich, articulate 
and now available Nachlass – his attempt to classify the different philosophies of 
mathematics. This makes it possible to show that different paths, despite having 
emerged in cultural contexts far from each other, but all oriented towards under-
standing the ‘reasoning of science’ of their time – to use an expression of Federigo 
Enriques – sometimes come to very similar results, such as the need for a new non-
analytical philosophy of mathematics. 
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True philosophy is nothing other than the spirit of science 
Maximilien Winter 
 
As far as the ‘building of science’ is concerned,  
it is possible to construct it without first laying foundations 
Gaston Bachelard 
 
Logical thought is not offered to us easily,  
and can’t produce its most beautiful fruit on its own plant.  
MARIO CASTELLANA 
 
12 
It needs to be engaged with something  
other than itself in order to be truly productive  
Hélène Metzger 
  
 
Almost all the critical studies of the work and thought of Gaston Bachelard 
dedicate a certain space to the philosophical topology, as presented in the 
first pages of the 1949 work, Le rationalisme appliqué1 – as it is not some-
thing commonly found in the works of other philosophers and in the philos-
ophy of science in particular; but it must be pointed out immediately that this 
topology is only one among the many other original theoretical methods ad-
vanced by the French epistemologist in order to comprehend the philosophi-
cal dimension implicit in the sciences of the early twentieth century, and es-
pecially in the new physics, in which mathematization processes were 
coming to play an ever more important role. On the one hand, the topology 
represents the result of a series of reflections which had already started in 
19282, beginning with Essai sur la connaissance approchée, as it has been 
shown in a recent study containing epistemological contributions on the 
cognitive structure of maths and the process of abstraction, with analyses of 
the works of Bernhard Reimann, Hermann Weyl3 and of Analysis Situs; at 
the same time, the topology cannot be explained adequately if one does not 
                       
1 G. BACHELARD, Le rationalisme appliqué, P.U.F., Paris 19704, p. 7. 
2 As is known, but it is always opportune to restate it, 1928 is a decisive year for the philoso-
phy of science. Next to Carnap’s Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, we must also put this 
Bachelardian work, which constitutes yet another research strategy, of epistemological nature, 
on the conceptual structure of mathematics.  
3 The attention to the work of Riemann and Hermann Weyl, an uncommon thing in 20th cen-
tury philosophy of science as Ludovico Geymonat denounced in Filosofia e filosofia della 
scienza (Feltrinelli, Milano 1960, p. 185), has determined the direction taken by French epis-
temology, in particular Bachelard’s. On this cfr. C. ALUNNI, Hermann Weyl chez Gaston 
Bachelard, in C. ALUNNI, M. CASTELLANA, D. RIA et A. ROSSI (cur.), Albert Einstein et Her-
mann Weyl 1955-2005. Questions épistémologiques ouvertes, Barbieri-Selvaggi Ed., Mandu-
ria 2010, pp. 13-24 and ns. Sur un petite phrase de Riemann. Aspects du débat français autour 
de la Reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics, “Revue de synthèse”, t. 138, (2017), pp. 195-
229. The critical literature on Bachelard has sometimes given a certain space to the role as-
signed to mathematics, but has not considered it constitutive of his most original propositions; 
on the other hand more recent works have highlighted its strategic role, also for the constant 
attention to the processes of abstraction taking place therein; cfr. the essays contained in C. 
ALUNNI, cur., Philosophie et mathématique. Bachelard et les mathématiques, “Revue de 
synthèse”, t. 136, (2015) and Spectres de Bachelard. Gaston Bachelard & l’École surration-
aliste, Hermann, Paris 2018; G. IENNA, Presentazione to G. BACHELARD, Metafisica della ma-
tematica, trad. it. by C. Alunni and G. Ienna, 2016, Castelvecchi, Roma 2016, pp. 5-18 and F. 
PALOMBI, L’elogio dell’astrazione. Gaston Bachelard e la filosofia della matematica, Mime-
sis, Milano 2017 where chapter IV is entirely dedicated to the topology and its genesis in 
Bachelardian discourse. 
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keep in mind that it is above all the result of a remarkable and constant re-
flection, almost unique in its kind, on the conceptual structure of mathemati-
cal physics as it came to take shape first in the work of Einstein and then in 
the quantum mechanics of Paul Dirac4. On the other hand the topology 
comes to constitute, as occurs in every Bachelardian work, almost a chapter 
in itself thanks to its investigating with ever more appropriate instruments 
that which the Italian mathematician and epistemologist Federigo Enriques – 
whom Bachelard nods to both in Le nouvel esprit scientifique and La for-
mation de l’esprit cientifique of 1938 – was already calling, in the early 20th 
century, ‘the reasoning of science’ and its ‘implicit philosophy’5. 
Bachelard’s scholars6 have not always sufficiently underlined the not-
coincidental fact that the first chapters of Bachelard’s works are expressly 
planned to outline the need for a philosophy that could measure up to the 
contents of the nouvel esprit scientifique, a philosophy which would make 
explicit the esprit’s various and differently articulated dimensions without 
the obligation to operate a reductio ad unum – an obligation which must al-
ways be negotiated with when we legitimately want to grasp the basic char-
acteristics of the cognitive processes as they are put in action by the various 
sciences. It is no coincidence, then, that in all of Bachelard’s writings a stra-
tegic role is assigned to the historical-epistemological investigation, consid-
ered an essential instrument for entering the tissu vivant of sciences and to 
systematically reach their avant-postes; such a theoretical strategy was em-
ployed to avoid normative discourse from two camps: from philosophers, 
accused of ignoring the extreme plurality of scientific facts; and from scien-
tists, who often use approaches which are not appropriate to the scope of the 
enjeux that they are implementing7. 
                       
4 Whether in the recently re-edited La valeur inductive de la relativité of 1929, or in 1934’s 
Le nouvel esprit scientifique, there are profound and original analyses on the role of tensor 
calculation, like in La philosophie du non and L’activité rationaliste de la physique contem-
poraine of 1951 where the scientific work of Dirac is analysed; and on this cfr. C. ALUNNI, 
Relativités et puissances spectrales chez Gaston Bachelard, “Revue de synthèse”, n. 1 (1999), 
pp. 73-110 and nss. Razionalismi senza dogmi. Per una epistemologia della fisica matemati-
ca, Rubbettino Ed., Soveria Mannelli 2004 and Gaston Bachelard ou la rêverie anagogique 
dans les enjeux du surrationnel, “Revue de synthèse”, t. 136 (2015), pp. 93-116. 
5 F. ENRIQUES, Scienza e razionalismo, Zanichelli, Bologna 19862, chap. I and pp. 114-115. 
6 An exception to which is the important study of C. VINTI, Il soggetto qualunque. Gaston 
Bachelard fenomenologo della soggettività epistemica ,Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli 
1997 and the more recent Ch. ALUNNI, Spectres de Bachelard, cit. 
7 The terms avant-postes and enjeux, like so many others, make up part of the rich vocabulary 
intentionally employed by Bachelard to situate himself at the heart of scientific questions. As 
affirmed by Alunni in his works herein cited, in the rich but at times misleading critical litera-
ture on the French epistemologist there is still a lack of an organic study on such linguistic 
aspect – which, among other things, would make clearer the original and undeniable aspects 
of his philosophy of science, not recognized in its true dimension.  
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With a language which has irritated and continues to irritate not only 
epistemologists belonging to other important traditions of research, but also 
scientists like René Thom, who denounce the literary deviation suffered by 
his epistemology, Bachelard employs the then used expression philosophie 
scientifique8, while also introducing other clarifying terms of such an expres-
sion, such as philosophie ouverte, philosophie dispersée, philosophie dis-
tribuée, philosophie différentielle, philosophie dialoguée, poliphilosophie, 
philosophie du mobile and philosophie du détail9, above all in order to avoid 
antiquatedly positivist and scientist descriptions of science. These expres-
sions, dense on the intellectual level in that they signify real programs of re-
search, and present above all in La Philosophie du non (1940), prepare the 
ground for the next phase of investigation, that of ‘philosophical topology’, 
helping us to better understand its aims and underlying epistemic sense. For 
this reason these terms take on the task of eliminating all pretensions of a to-
talizing vision, or of what he calls the “integral philosophy of philosophers”, 
against which even some scientists uncritically put forward their own philo-
sophical point of view, derived exclusively from a unilateral vision of the 
“realm of facts”10; these unilateral positions then produce, and are at the 
same time victims of, real “epistemological obstacles” to the comprehension 
of the veritative contents implicit in different moments of the history de la 
pensée des sciences – another idea, not to say category, of the Bachelardian 
path of research, little studied in its true dimensions11 and ever more relevant 
                       
8 Recall that in 1935 and 1937 there took place in Paris, in the wake of those in the first dec-
ade of the century, two significant Congrès de Philosophie Scientifique which saw the estab-
lishment of logical neo-positivism and the development of that same philosophy of science, 
and on this cfr. Alle origini della ‘nuova epistemologia’. Il Congrès Descartes del 1937, Il 
Protagora, Lecce 1992. 
9 All these terms, however, acquire a more precise meaning if they are inserted in that ‘dialec-
tic suprarationalism’ enucleated in La philosophie du non, which is a project of dynamic and 
plural rationalism that takes account for the various ‘regions’ of scientific thought with the 
recognition of individual epistemic values. On this cfr. Il surrazionalismo di Gaston 
Bachelard, Glaux Ed., Napoli 1974 and Razionalismi senza dogmi. Per una epistemologia 
della fisica matematica, cit., chap. VI; Ch. ALUNNI (cur.), Science et philosophie au XXe siè-
cle. L’École de Zürich et le programme surrationaliste, “Revue de synthèse”, t. 126, 
(2005/29) and Spectres de Bachelard, cit. ; cfr. also V. BONTEMS, (cur.), Bachelard et l’avenir 
de la culture. Du surrationalisme à la raison créative, Presses des Mines, Paris 2018. 
10 G. BACHELARD, La philosophie du non, P.U.F., Paris 19705, p. 7. With the language of the 
Columbian writer Nicolás Gómez Dávila, it can be said that both these positions, on the one 
hand of the philosophers and the other of the scientists, are dominated by “imperialistic pre-
tensions”, those which an articulate and healthy epistemology – in Bachelardian terms dialec-
tic and historical, that is more appropriate to the real scientific contents – must be able to 
identify and eliminate as much as possible. Also cfr. N. GÓMEZ DÁVILA, In margine a un testo 
implicito, trad. it. F. Volpi, Adelphi, Milano 2001, p. 16 
11Only in the work of Charles Alunni – starting from the first years of this century with the 
foundation of a Laboratoire Disciplinaire very significantly named “Pensée des sciences” – 
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and indispensable to be able to combat with appropriate weapons the various 
positions which lead to those which Georges Canguilhem has called ‘scien-
tific ideologies’12. 
Keeping in mind such a fundamental idea of scientific thought13 pre-
vented Bachelard (it is not a coincidence that Dominique Lecourt will define 
Bachelard as “the great forgotten, by both scientism and anti-science”14) 
from falling into normative positions, as often happened to other, more stud-
ied and practiced strands of epistemological thought, those which are more 
involved in trying to establish supra-historical criteria of scientific philoso-
phy. And if in his works there appear geometric representations like the no-
tion of epistemological profile and spectrum15 as can be found in La philoso-
                                                      
has such an idea been well emphasised and put into practice; but the idea of scientific thought 
found its own more precise collocation in the 1934 work of Federigo Enriques, La significa-
tion de l’histoire de la pensée scientifique, not coincidentally kept systematically present by 
Bachelard. On this cfr. thenss. Il metodo storico in filosofia della scienza, in F. ENRIQUES, Il 
significato della storia del pensiero scientifico, Barbieri-Selvaggi Ed., Manduria 2007, p. 87-
127 and Il tetraedro storico-epistemologico, in F. ENRIQUES-H. METZGER, Storia e struttura 
del pensiero scientifico, Barbieri-Selvaggi Ed., Manduria 2014, pp. 117-145. 
12 Cfr. G. Canguilhem, Ideologia e razionalità nella storia delle scienze della vita, trad. it., La 
Nuova Italia, Firenze 1992, pp. 25-38; it must be kept in mind that in the 20th century French 
epistemological culture the attention to the ideological implications of scientific theories was 
a not inconsiderable characteristic precisely due to the anchorage to their historical dimension, 
and in this sense the figure of Hélène Metzger distinguished herself in her incomplete and 
posthumous work, La science, l’appel à la religion et la volonté humaine, written during the 
years of the Nazi occupation of France. cfr. H. METZGER, La scienza, l’appello alla religione 
e la volontà umana, trad. it. by M. Castellana, Pensa Multimedia-ENS ‘Pensée des sciences’, 
2014. 
13 The Bachelardian term pensée des sciences is translated as ‘scientific thought’, but it must 
be remembered that this latter, commonly used term makes part of the lexicon of the history 
of science, a discipline which in the 1930s was, just like the philosophy of science, a field still 
in its formative stages, and one which in different circles developed in alternative to the phi-
losophy of science itself; but, to use an expression of Bruno Widmar, they are both ‘conceptu-
al techniques’ directed towards accounting for the ‘reasoning of science’ on the theoretical as 
well as the historical plain: cfr. B. WIDMAR, L’epistemologia, (1974), by M. Castellana, Milel-
la, Lecce 2017, ch. I. In Bachelard, as in Enriques, the expressions pensée des sciences and 
scientific thought have a strong theoretical connotation, and they are intended to especially 
signify the intrinsic capacity of sciences to produce tout court thought along specific historical 
paths; it could be said without exaggeration that theirs are the only philosophies of science of 
the early 20th century which are concentrated systematically on the structure and history of 
scientific thought. At the same time it could be said that a greater awareness of their methods 
would allow us to combat with more appropriate weapons those philosophical positions, old 
and new, which, because anchored to the positivistic vision of sciences, negate their theoreti-
cal and cultural value in the sense of Poincaré.  
14 D. LECOURT, La philosophie dans les sciences, Revue de synthèse, (2005/2) t. 126, pp.451-
454. And always following in the footsteps of Enriques and Bachelard, Lecourt directed the 
composition of the Dictionnaire d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences, P.U.F., Paris 1999. 
15 On the notion of epistemological profile, seen from the angle of the phenomenology of the 
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phie du non – conceived even before Le rationalisme appliqué (in which 
there appears a graphic that gives theoretical substance to the philosophical 
topology) – these representations are not the fruit of intellectual extrava-
gance due to a lack of rigor or to literary diversions, as they appeared to 
some; rather, they are the results of precise methods which aim to grasp the 
internal dialectics of scientific thought and its fundamental concepts. And 
these dialectics are not reducible to either externally imposed schemas or to 
philosophies which exalt their results at the same time as being rendered al-
ready obsolete by the advance of the current research, which research, as a 
result of this advance, is in need of other, more complex approaches.  
The primary Bachelardian aim, often not kept in mind adequately 
enough, is that of avoiding those “meta-scientific extensions” deriving from 
a theory which is seen as constantly on the prowl, an idea which had already 
been discussed in the first years of the 20th century by a figure like Maxi-
milien Winter16, still today completely unknown; this subtle epistemologist 
seems to almost use ante litteram a Bachelardian language and at the same 
time live in its identical atmosphere; and in fact he confronted the develop-
ments of the new logic and mathematical theories of the end of the 19th cen-
tury, with the aim of creating an autonomous space for philosophical reflec-
tion, not to say a ‘philosophical topology’. Some of his writings are oriented, 
just as are subsequently Bachelard’s, towards understanding his contempo-
rary science and addressing it with appropriate instruments, and it is no coin-
cidence that they significantly appeared in the “Revue de Métaphysique et de 
Morale”. In this journal, of which Winter was one of the founders, much 
space was dedicated from the very beginning to the critical study of the 
‘connaissances mathématiques’, and to the point of branding it, as Alunni 
says, as a real journal of philosophy of mathematics, born with the precise 
aim of dealing above all with what was happening at the time within this sci-
ence, and already with a decisively post-positivist perspective, as well as al-
ready oriented (like the almost concomitant first Vienna Circle) towards lay-
ing the foundations of a new approach in the field of the emerging 
epistemological literature, where such analysis, however, could not ignore 
the historical point of view17. 
                                                      
epistemic subject, see C. VINTI, Il soggetto qualunque, cit., chap. IX, and on the concept of 
the spectrum that finds its roots in the analysis of Hilbertian vectorial spaces, cfr. C. ALUNNI, 
Spectres de Bachelard, cit. 
16 M. WINTER, La méthode dans la philosophie des mathématiques, Alcan, Paris 1911, p. 51. 
17 C. Alunni in France has recently been engaged in the rediscovery of this figure, who had 
among other things a close relationship with Federigo Enriques. On this cfr. C. ALUNNI, Max-
imilien Winter et Federigo Enriques: des harmonies exhumées, in C. ALUNNI-Y. ANDRÉ, 
Federigo Enriques o le armonie nascoste della cultura europea. Tra scienza e filosofia, 
Edizioni della Normale, Pisa 2015, pp. 101-147 and Federigo Enriques et la méthode histori-
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Thanks to the mediation of his master Léon Brunschvicg, the works of 
Bachelard are situated in this historico-theoretical juncture, little taken into 
account by scholars and even more radicalized in its different dynamics with 
the demand for a permanent semantic revolution at every level, even in the 
applied terminology; this demand finds its point of culmination precisely in 
Le rationalisme appliqué where that rationalisme du mobile scientifique is 
systematically put into action. Since language is non-neutral, being a deposi-
tory of already consolidated points of view, it must be made ‘mobile’ to be 
able to fully grasp what is stirred up in scientific thought, even because who-
ever deals with the unique and unrepeatable moment of scientific discovery 
– a central theme for every philosophy of science – doesn’t participate di-
rectly in that event and must reconstruct it through its texts. Well-known 
ideas such as epistemological rupture, epistemological obstacle and episte-
mological discontinuity will acquire therefore more theoretical sense if they 
are inserted in this context of total renovation of the categories of thought – a 
renovation which becomes, by extension, one that involves the very struc-
tures of the human ‘esprit’, the epistemic subject. The utilization, then, of 
prefixes such as ‘sur’, ‘pan’, ‘re’, ‘ex’18 serves the project of restoring a 
qualitatively different meaning to the common terms of scientific and philo-
sophic vocabulary because, as he often says in various works, every analysis 
is based on the texts of scientists whose different implicit and explicit his-
torico-theoretical articulations must be brought out; the philosophy of sci-
ence itself in its turn is called on to develop a role of total renovation of its 
own conceptual and linguistic structures, since its primary task is to bring 
back to life the difficult moment of the scientific discovery, l’hinc et il nunc 
of the genesis of new ideas which, as such, is not reducible to any prefixed 
schemas. The risk is to get caught up in certain theoretical accidents, due to 
the fact that such a philosophy could still have the necessity to simplify cer-
tain situation-types, when instead the scientific process remains structurally 
complex in every moment of its growth.  
The recourse to philosophical topology serves the scope of eliminating 
underlying or implicit absolutist and normative positions, whether on the 
part of philosophers or scientists, and among other things it doesn’t allow us 
to overlook Bachelard’s interest in the corpus of mathematics, as it has been 
unfortunately done by some of his past critics. And even if such interest, as 
we have demonstrated in some of our other writings, is oriented towards 
comprehending the ever-growing processes of mathematization present in 
                                                      
co-critique, in Dossier Enriques, “Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science”, 14, (2015), pp. 
75-116.  
18 For a more detailed analysis of the heuristic role of these prefixes in Bachelard’s work, cfr. 
C. VINTI, Gaston Bachelard, une épistémologie du sujet, Mimesis, Milano 2014, cap. IV. 
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physics, to the point of becoming a point of reference for other French 20th 
century figures like first Albert Lautman and later Gilles Châtelet19, it is al-
ways aimed at grasping the specific attributes of mathematics; their creative 
power through the process of ever-growing generalization and abstraction; 
their way of being always more rigorous even in the midst of continuous 
conceptual change, as Federigo Enriques had emphasized in Per la storia 
della logica20; their way of being and producing knowledge and of being, as 
a consequence, thought; their implicit philosophy. For this reason the typi-
cally French phrase philosophie mathématique is best suited to the 
Bachelardian path, because it is directed towards comprehending the ‘syn-
thetic’ and at the same time historical character of the entire mathematical 
corpus. Such phrase suits Bachelard’s work better than the term ‘philosophy 
of mathematics’ that, as it is known, belongs to another important line of 
epistemological thought.  
The topology therefore can be considered as one of the different forms 
of translation in philosophical terms of the contents of knowledge produced 
by maths, which in their turn acquire more epistemic value in being further 
organized as mathematical physics, and in the consequent applicative impli-
cation; and if this outcome seems more evident in graphic representations, as 
in the profile and the spectrum, it is the philosophie mathématique, with its 
autonomous contents, which is the base of reference. At the same time the 
topology has the task of comprehending the scientific present, of grasping 
what is happening in the tissu vivant of mathematics, of catching what needs 
to be caught in its depth, outside of the existing philosophical framework; 
and even if it is the precipitate of a process begun in the first works, it also 
shows in a polemic manner the synthetic structural character of mathematics 
in a moment in which the analytic vision predominated21. The topology, 
                       
19 But, as we have demonstrated, all this derives from Bachelard’s epistemological deepening 
of the scientific work first of Reimann and later of Hermann Weyl, a fact not adequately em-
phasized by the scholars of his thought, with the exceptions of the work of Alunni and Pal-
ombi, already cited. Cfr. Sur une petite phrase de Riemann, cit. and For an epistemology of 
mathematical contents: Albert Lautman, “Lettera Matematica”, International Editions Spring-
er, 2018, pp. 1-10. 
20 Cfr. F. ENRIQUES, Per la storia della logica, Zanichelli, Bologna 1922. 
21 The ‘synthetic’ character of Bachelard’s epistemology, or better said the insistence on the 
synthetic aspects of science present above all in La Philosophie du non and in the following 
works, has not been adequately analyzed. In fact, more than historical epistemology, we can 
better talk in his case of synthetic epistemology, both to distinguish it from the contemporary 
analytical epistemology and to grasp its own specificity. Here ‘synthetic’ refers to the fact that 
every theory, in the moment in which it is formed, brings in a new theoretical configuration 
and presents itself intentionally as a transformative synthesis, by making the novum interact 
with the past, which past is then redefined and at the same time delimited and made to be-
come more rigorous in its own ambit. This is well expressed in L’activité rationaliste de la 
physique contemporaine and in the final chapter of La Philosophie du non, significantly titled 
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among other things, responds to this need for a faithful representation of the 
state of mathematical knowledge and its creative moments – with the over-
coming of the stage linked to the logical-set-theory moment and a necessari-
ly polemical charge in the background: 
 
And when one passes from science to the philosophy of science, the polem-
ical aspect of the truth makes its appearance. This is so true that it could be 
said that the philosophy of science is that which in science belongs to po-
lemical reason.22 
 
For these reasons and to make clearer the Bachelardian path, it is not out 
of place to use the term ‘topological reason’ that comes to represent first and 
foremost that ‘polemical reason’ opposing the existing philosophies of sci-
ence; at the same time such reason is able to present the possible spectrum of 
the implicit philosophies, which must nonetheless be tested on the ground of 
that applied ‘dialogued philosophy’ typical of the nouvel esprit scientifique, 
where the raison mathématique – a term in the French epistemological tradi-
tion used not by coincidence by Gödel23 – plays, with its basic creative mo-
ments, a constitutive role in its diverse articulations24. Bachelard always held 
                                                      
‘La valeur synthétique de la philosophie du non’. In the mathematical corpus such ‘synthesis’ 
acquires particular connotations, as in the case of non-euclidean geometries, studied in Le 
nouvel esprit scientifique, tensorial calculation and the theory of groups, which also are some 
of Bachelard’s objects of analysis. An organic synthetic philosophy of ‘contemporary mathe-
matics’, in the Bachelardian sense of the term, and in the light of the results of Grothendieck, 
Serre, Connes, Attiyah, Kontsevitch, Zilber, Gromov and others, is present in the 2012 work 
of Fernando Zalamea, which develops some theses of Albert Lautman. Also cfr. F. ZALAMEA, 
La philosophie synthétique des mathématiques, tr. fr. by C. Alunni, Hermann, Paris 2018 and 
A. LAUTMAN, La matematica come resistenza, tr. it. and introduction by M. Castellana, 
Castelvecchi, Roma 2017, with an afterword by Zalamea. 
22 G. BACHELARD, Le rationalisme appliqué, cit., pp. 68-69. In the scientific path there has 
always been the need to sweep away pseudotruth through an engagement of reflexive charac-
ter, as indeed said Federico Cesi who, in founding the Accademia dei Lincei in 1603, spoke of 
the necessity for those who were preparing to know the ‘grand theatre’ of nature to systemati-
cally carry out a ‘philosophical militia’; see Carlo Vinti’s introduction to his new critical edi-
tion of the works of F. CESI, Il natural desiderio di sapere. The Natural Desire for 
Knowledge, Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, Vatican City 2003. 
23 The term raison mathématique belongs to the Cartesian tradition and in France, together 
with the almost synonym philosophie mathématique, was resumed in the second half of the 
19th century to discuss the new cognitive character assumed by mathematics after the advent 
of non-euclidean geometries and the work of Hermite; cfr. G. DARBOUX, Éloges académiques 
et discours, Hermann, Paris 1912, p. 142, a work used by K. Gödel to understand Hermite’s 
particular ‘platonist’ point of view. Also cfr. K. GÖDEL, Collected Works, Volume III: Un-
published Essays and Lectures, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, p. 323. 
24 Recently the work of Alexandre Grothendieck is receiving a certain critical attention aimed 
at explaining his unusual creativity in the field of the mathematical corpus; but a Bachelardian 
reading in the light of his ‘synthetic’ viewpoint could reveal itself to be very useful in trying 
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a non-static vision of mathematics, and saw in mathematics’ structural 
changes not an illness, not the advent of the ‘pathology of truth’, to use a 
metaphor from the Bourbakist group, but the radical renewal of its mode of 
being with inevitable implications of theoretical character; and it is for this 
reason that he considers that which he calls “rapid philosophical topology” 
almost as “the keyboard on which tap most of the philosophical questions 
regarding science”25: 
 
                                                           Idealism 
↑ 
Conventionalism 
↑ 
Formalism 
↑ 
Applied Rationalism   and  Dialectic Materialism 
↓ 
Positivism 
↓ 
Empiricism 
↓ 
Realism26 
 
But to better comprehend the function of topological reason it would do 
well to keep in mind the entire Bachelardian path, which, beginning with Es-
sai sur la connaissance approchée, was all oriented towards laying the foun-
dations of a ‘new epistemology’, as it is clearly emphasized in L’expérience 
de l’espace dans la physique contemporaine, where an entire chapter is ded-
icated to the “philosophical consequences of the notion of mathematical op-
erator”. This ‘new epistemology’ of mathematics “must commit itself on two 
                                                      
to understand the inspiration, methodology, the creative processes put into being, his polemi-
cal force, his germinal and implicit epistemology and to avoid irrational interpretations of it. 
First attempts are present in the work of philosophers-mathematicians such as F. PATRAS, La 
pensée mathématique contemporaine, P.U.F., Paris 2001; ZALAMEA, La philosophie 
synthétique and R. GUITART, Deux problèmes en vue d’une épistémologie transitive des 
mathématiques, “Revue de synthèse”, n.1-2, (2015), pp. 237-279 ; cfr. also AA.VV., Matemat-
ica ribelle. Le due vite di Alexander Grothendieck, Il Corriere della Sera, Milano 2014. 
25 G. BACHELARD, Le Rationalisme appliqué, cit., p. 7. 
26 Ivi, p. 5. For a more detailed analysis of the topology and of the Bachelardian critiques to 
formalist positions, cfr. F. PALOMBI, Elogio dell’astrazione, cit., pp. 81-87. But Lecourt had 
already stressed the role of the arrows, “symmetrical and opposed to the central line”, and at 
the same time highlighted the way in which the topology analyzes “the nature of each of the 
doctrines which resides not in them [the arrows] but in the fold as a fixed element of philo-
sophical space”. Cfr. D. LECOURT, L’epistemologia storica di Gaston Bachelard, in G. 
CANGUILHEM-D.LECOURT, L’epistemologia di Gaston Bachelard, ed. by F. Bonicalzi, Jaca 
Book, Milano 1997, p. 129. 
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opposite fronts: against the followers of mathematical symbolism, and 
against the followers of philosophical realism”. Against the supporters of 
these two point of views, and against others that under different forms are 
only their uncritical offshoots, “we give the same response: mathematics, 
with its inventive thought, goes beyond both conventions and experience”27. 
Thus the topology presents itself as a theoretical device, as a real conceptual 
technique for critically reviewing – both from an historical and above all 
from a properly theoretical point of view – the epistemic sense of mathemat-
ical theories in their almost necessary articulation towards physical-
mathematical conceptual organizations. All this is done in the wake of the 
work of Reimann, Weyl and of a certain Hilbert, with the aim of overcoming 
those naïve visions of Platonism present in various ways in the reflections 
both of scientists and of philosophers of mathematics28. At the same time the 
                       
27 G. BACHELARD, L’esperienza dello spazio nella fisica contemporanea, tr. it. by M.R. 
Abramo, A. Siciliano Ed., Messina 2002, p. 56 and p. 58; This work, like the second chapter 
of the 1929 La valeur inductive de la relativité, reaffirms ‘the inductive value of mathematics’ 
always on the bases of the analyses of the philosophical consequences of the advent of tenso-
rial calculation, considered decisive in the relativistic doctrines. Charles Alunni has empha-
sized the particular ‘inductive value’ attributed to mathematics by Bachelard and the constitu-
tive role, as well as ‘synthetic’, which that assumes in his theoretical device. Again, a little 
studied topic. See cfr. C. ALUNNI, Spectres de Bachelard, cit. 
28 To understand Bachelard’s position towards Hilbert, studied first in L’expérience de 
l’espace dans la physique contemporaine of 1937 and then in Le Rationalisme appliqué, it is 
also important to take account of Bachelard’s reading of the first works of Albert Lautman, 
appeared first in 1938, works in which much space is dedicated to the works of the German 
mathematician and to a way of reading their philosophical implications which goes beyond 
the interpretations given at the time by members of the Circle of Vienna. See Essai sur les 
notions de structure et de existence en mathématiques and Essai sur l’unité des sciences 
mathématiques dans leur développement actuel (Ed.Vrin, Paris 2006); if the second Bachelard 
in the epistemological field (1949-1953) is more oriented towards a synthetic vision of his 
philosophy of science, perhaps this is due to the work of this young philosopher of mathemat-
ics and not coincidentally in a letter sent to him in 1938 Bachelard writes that he is “bien 
frappé par la richesse des aperçus” and above all for having “su garder la pensée, en évinçant 
les calculs, difficulté Presque insurmontable”; see cfr. H. BENIS-SINACEUR, Lettre inédite de 
Gaston Bachelard à Albert Lautman, “Revue d’histoire des sciences”, t. XL, 1, (1987), p. 
129. These aperçus, emphasised by Bachelard, are the fruit of an unusual reading by Lautman 
of the mathematical theory of the early 20th century, and of prime attention given to the theo-
rems of Gödel and Gentzen, who was seen in a philosophical position considered unfitting 
with the philosophies of mathematics of the time, as indeed the Swiss philosopher of mathe-
matics Ferdinand Gonseth was warning at the end of the ‘30s, the author of works such as Les 
fondements des mathématiques, de la relativité générale à l’intuitionnisme (1929), Les 
Mathématiques et la réalité mathématique (1936), Philosophie mathématique (1939). A first 
exposition of the need for a new philosophy of mathematics and of a ‘new epistemology’, dif-
ferent from that which was about to become the Standard current, was put forward at the se-
cond Congrès de Philosophie Scientifique in Paris in 1937 by Gonseth, Cavaillès and 
Lautman for mathematics and by Enriques for philosophy of science. On this cfr. Alle origini 
della ‘nuova epistemologia’. Il Congrès Descartes del 1937, cit. and A. Lautman, La ma-
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topology has the function of sweeping away from philosophical analysis the 
consideration of mathematics as a language, consideration which the topolo-
gy sees as a commonplace accepted almost as an inherent fact of mathemat-
ics’ nature. Such a consideration is made with diverse motivations and vari-
ables by different strands of epistemological thought which are inattentive to 
their own particular historical and ‘synthetic’ nature:  
 
It is necessary to break with that cliché which is dear to certain sceptic phi-
losophers that want to see in mathematics only a language. On the contrary, 
mathematics is a thought, a thought secure in its own language. The physi-
cist think experience with this mathematical thought… To comment on ex-
perimental results without giving an account of theoretical and mathemati-
cal preparations would be like putting to one side some of the greatest 
lessons of synthetic philosophy… But the axis of the experimental determi-
nations of contemporary science doesn’t follow the directions postulated by 
Platonic Realism… One must have an awareness of abstraction in the mo-
ment in which some abstract plans are needed to inform experience29. 
 
The Bachelardian topology or raison topologique, strengthened by this 
synthetic vision of mathematics considered implicit in the corpus and con-
ceived as thought, assigns the correct role to that process which leads to the 
“formation of formalism”, which process reinforces itself thanks to the “re-
sults of rational thought, but which cannot exhaust all of the work of rational 
thought”; at the same time the topology serves to eliminate as much as pos-
sible another commonplace typical of the philosophies which consider math-
ematics to be a language, which see “in theoretical science a collection of 
conventions, a series of thoughts more or less comfortably organised in the 
clear language of mathematics, which is nothing but the esperanto of rea-
son.”30 But this long battle against the consideration of mathematics as the 
‘esperanto of reason’ finds its justification also in the philosophie du mobile 
scientifique and above all in the enjeux31 that distinguish that; it methodolog-
                                                      
tematica come resistenza, cit. To such an end it is to be kept in mind that Bachelard main-
tained a constant rapport with Ferdinand Gonseth, to the point of being the cofounder in 1947 
of the magazine ‘Dialectica’ together with Paul Bernays; for a comparison between Bachelard 
and Gonseth, cfr. C. VINTI, Présence de Ferdinand Gonseth dans la pensée de Gaston 
Bachelard, “Revue de synthèse”, n. 2, (2005), pp. 391-415. 
29 G. BACHELARD, L’activité rationaliste de la physique contemporaine, cit., pp. 29-30. 
30 G. BACHELARD, Le Rationalisme appliqué, cit., p. 5. 
31 The term enjeux is often found in the works of Bachelard, but it was Gilles Châtelet after-
wards who gave it a more precise meaning in studying the work of Grassmann, Argand, 
Maxwell, Hamilton. cfr. G. CHÂTELET, Les enjeux du mobile. Mathématique, physique, phi-
losophie, Ed. du Seuil, Paris 1993 ; on Châtelet cfr. Razionalismi senza dogmi, cit., chap. VI; 
C. ALUNNI, Des ‘Enjeux du mobile’ à ‘L’Enchantement du virtuel’ - et retour, Introduction to 
G. CHATELET, L’enchantement du virtuel. Mathématique, physique, philosophie, by C. Alunni 
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ically carries out the scientific liquidation du passé, but to insert it in a more 
general context, where it acquires more sense to the extent that its basic con-
cepts change meaning, as is affirmed in other works; and at the same time it 
nails down the philosophies and the philosophic space to their time, reveal-
ing in them their delayed structures compared to the real advance of ever-
more complex knowledge, in need of qualitatively different approaches with 
the contextual criticism of the fundamental traditions. At the same time, the 
introduction of the philosophical topology has the aim of “asserting some 
epistemological nuances that a more blocked, static thought can oblite-
rate”32. Such epistemological nuances, even if sometimes they are not visi-
ble, are present in the tissu and the folds of science, as Ludovico Geymonat 
will say; furthermore, as Moritz Schlick33 had already remarked with other 
words in 1918, the philosopher of science has the obligation of bringing the-
se nuances to the light, thus giving voice to the philosophical spirit of sci-
ence.  
The Bachelardian topology, even if “it was established paying specific 
attention to the physics and chemistry contemporary to him, seems to pos-
sess a more general value”34; it is its open and problematic character that 
lends it this potential to be used in other contexts, a character developed due 
to the fact that it deals with the enjeux and the risks, whether epistemological 
or ontological, that are produced by science in general and mathematics in 
particular in their history starting from non-euclidian geometry – an object of 
constant analysis to the point of becoming the mark of a way of understand-
ing the work of philosophy as the ‘philosophy of the non’. For this reason it 
can be considered heuristically useful first of all to reformulate it by inter-
                                                      
and C. Paoletti, Ed. Rue d’Ulm, Paris 2010, pp. 9-56 and the recent number of the “Revue de 
synthèse”, n. 1-4, (2017), Philosophie contemporaine des matématiciens: Évariste Galois, 
Gian-Carlo Rota, Gilles Châtelet, by C. Alunni, Y. André & C. Paoletti. 
32 G. BACHELARD, L’esperienza dello spazio nella fisica contemporanea, cit., p. 58; the 
Bachelardian insistence on the term expérience present in various works must be emphasised. 
In fact it is common in French epistemology, for example in the work of Cavaillès and 
Lautman, and is an expression of their idea of the philosophical analysis of concepts as being 
direct participation in the veçù of science and in, as Federigo Enriques said, the ‘labour of 
concepts’, attentive to their creative and inventive moments that avoid getting stuck in a 
‘blocked thought’ and then producing ‘metaextensions’ of a theory. 
33 M. SCHLICK, Teoria generale della conoscenza, trad. it., F. Angeli Ed., Milano 1986, p. 12. 
A critical history of the philosophy of science among other things demonstrates that in their 
beginnings Schlick and Bachelard had many objectives in common with almost identical 
propositions. For a first attempt to study Schlick and Bachelard together, cfr. Spazio e tempo 
nell’epistemologia di Gaston Bachelard, in Gaston Bachelard. Bilancio critico di una episte-
mologia, by M. Castellana, “Il Protagora”, 5, anno XXIV, (1984), pp. 27-43. In this mono-
thematic issue of the magazine ‘Il Protagora’ there are essays by G. Canguilhem, M. Loi, R. 
Cavaillès, V. Tonini, M. Quaranta, C. Vinti and others.  
34 F. PALOMBI, Elogio dell’astrazione, cit., p. 83. 
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vening on some gaps, as Fabrizio Palombi did, integrating it from above 
with the ‘Phenomenology’ and from below with the ‘Intuitionism’, and at 
the centre with the ‘Phenomenotechnique’, to give account to the 
Bachelardian wake of that "polyphilosophy of mathematics”35. After all, 
Bachelard himself invites us on the first page of Le rationalisme appliqué to 
“widen a little this philosophical spectrum without modifying the order of 
the fundamental philosophies”, always with the objective of being able to 
grasp some of the “new philosophical nuances”36.  
But it must be kept in mind that, based on the Bachelardian topology, or 
better, on topological reason, the analytic/synthetic dyad (or poles, to use the 
Bachelardian language) comes to play a decisive role. These two poles, even 
if it is difficult to give them the right collocation inasmuch as they are more 
than philosophical positions, represent two essential moments of mathemati-
cal operations, which are not easily comprehensible if not from within a 
viewpoint more attentive to those operations’ particular historical dimension. 
Despite the asymmetry between the two, they give life to mathematics’ al-
ways-open living tissu, where that specific object of the philosophie mathé-
matique37, the continuous dialectic between schémas de structure and sché-
mas de génèse (to use the terms of Albert Lautman), is realized. Indeed, 
thanks to the continuous encounter of these two ways of understanding and 
practising mathematics, mathematical creativity is enhanced, and for this 
they can be considered some of the invariant factors that permeate the histor-
ical-conceptual path, rich with articulations and ever-new philosophical nu-
ances. Having kept in mind this internal dialectic of mathematical thinking 
has allowed the Bachelardian path to historicize the idea of ‘scientific phi-
losophy’ and to see in it various levels corresponding to the different stages 
of the raison mathématique, from Euclid onwards. The proposed philosophi-
cal topology fully satisfies these continuous demands for ‘new apodicticity’, 
for transformation and deformation of the base concepts that the traditional 
theory of knowledge was not able to introduce into its epistemic circuit, in-
asmuch as it was tied to concepts believed to be unchangeable.  
We want to make ours some of the solicitations present in Le rational-
isme appliqué to try to understand the concomitance of certain philosophical 
nuances present in other almost contemporaneous paths, like that of Kurt 
Gödel, and also to avoid defining him, as has been done recently, as “the 
great Prince of Darkness of modern mathematics”, because with its theorems 
“it finds itself suspended in mid-air”38, lacking in foundations because it is 
                       
35Ibid., p. 84-85. 
36 G. BACHELARD, Le Rationalisme appliqué, cit., p. 7. 
37 Cf. A. LAUTMAN, Essai sur les notions de structure et d’existence en mathématiques, cit. 
38 D.F. WALLACE, Tutto, e di più. Una storia compatta dell’infinito, (2003), trad. it., Codice, 
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not easy to accept the idea, as Bachelard pointed out, that it is possible to 
construct without foundations. Even a cursory study of these two philoso-
phers bears witness to the fact that from the comparative analysis of deter-
minate problems, from the “exchange of protocols of a problematic”, “an at-
om of rational communion” can appear, a form of “interrationalism”, “the 
union of the proof’s workers”. Faithful to this Bachelardian appeal – to un-
derstand what was slowly emerging in the philosophie mathématique of the 
1950’s, starting from the “understanding of the stating of a problem” – one 
can also “develop a type of topology of the problematic”39, that is the desire 
and at the same time the need for a different viewpoint with which to look at 
what was occurring in that which Hermann Weyl called the vast “granite 
empire of mathematics”, subjected as it was to profound transformations of 
its base concepts with the creation of new sectors and the emergence of new 
questions. In the light of this extension of the idea of ‘topology of the prob-
lematic’, or topological reason, the entire path of Austrian logic can be seen 
as a constant and successful attempt to construct “the edifice of mathemat-
ics” without foundations and to theoretically live in such an atmosphere; in 
this way the considerations present in various of Gödel’s essays of the 50’s 
and 60’s can acquire more epistemic meaning, essays in which, to use 
Bachelardian language, can be glimpsed an implicit philosophy, or better a 
germinal epistemology, sometimes more sketchy and sometimes more hid-
den: Some basic theorems on the foundations of mathematics and their im-
plications (1951), Is mathematics syntax of language? (1953/59), The mod-
ern development of the foundations of mathematics in the light of philosophy 
(1961/?)40. 
                                                      
Torino 2005, pp. 228 note and 235 note. 
39 G. BACHELARD, Le rationalisme appliqué, cit., p. 56. 
40 K. GÖDEL, Collected Works, cit., pp. 304-323; pp. 335-362 and pp. 374-386. As is known, 
there are different versions of some of these unpublished essays, in particular those between 
1953-59; this indicates one the one hand the scrupulousness of Austrian logic and on the other 
the difficulty of putting forward a more organic philosophical point of view. However these 
essays are the testimony to the sufferings of a philosophical ‘pilgrimage’, and must be taken 
in this sense not only for what they have effectively produced, but also as indices of a path of 
which we can gather indications of a certain significance, as indeed has been done in primis 
by Hao Wang – who as is known had various meetings with Gödel – and also by Jean Petitot 
in the ‘90s who developed the idea of a transcendental Platonism. Other than the curators of 
the Collected Works, there are some recent scholars to which we refer who have tried to put 
them forward in a more organic way; among these cfr. F. RODRIGUEZ-CONSUEGRA, Un inédito 
de Gödel contra el convencionalismo: historia, anàlisis, contexto y traduction, “Arbor”, 
CXLII, (1992), pp. 323-348) and Kurt Gödel. Unpublished Philosophical Essays, Birkäuser 
Verlag, Basel-Boston-Berlin 1995; J. PETITOT, Pour un platonisme transcendantale, in M. 
PANZA- J.M. SALANSKIS (eds.), L’objectivité mathématique. Platonisme et structures for-
melles, Masson, Paris 1995, pp. 147-172; G. LOLLI, Incompletezza. Saggio su Kurt Gödel, Il 
Mulino, Bologna 1992; Da Euclide a Gödel, Il Mulino, Bologna 2004 and Sotto il segno di 
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The Bachelardian reading of these essays of Gödel is compels us not to 
see the two men separately; rather to see them together as a sign of a real 
strategy aimed at delineating a vision of mathematics which does not easily 
fit with those other visions dominant in that period, a vision distant from the 
“prejudices in vogue”, as Gödel himself often says, for example in letters to 
Wang. At the same time the Bachelardian reading can help to review in an-
other light Gödel’s interest in Kantian philosophy41 and also in the philoso-
phy of Leibniz, as well as, in a more limited but not random way, in the phi-
losophy of Husserl, so as to also insert these figures in a more general 
context, the way it came to shape itself in other concomitant paths.42 In fact, 
a critical history of the philosophy of science can’t fail to give these two the 
right importance and at least allows us to consider them some signals of 
some other cultural atmosphere that is struggling to emerge. At the same 
time, attentive to the real changes taking place, it helps us to situate the ‘to-
pology of the epistemological problems’ in a more appropriate context, and 
again allows us to see more ‘atoms of rational communion’, more ‘proof’s 
workers’ engaged in an ‘interrationalist’ path, the forming of a small epis-
temic community that, while being small, feels the need to put forward an-
other viewpoint with which to consider the Weylian ‘empire of mathematics’ 
if not the idea of a further ‘breakthrough’, in the Schlickian sense of the 
term, in the epistemological literature. 
                                                      
Gödel, Il Mulino, Bologna 2007; J. HINTIKKA, On Gödel, Wadsworth, Belmont 2000; M. 
DAVIS, What Did Gödel Believe and When Did He Believe it?,”The Bulletin of Symbolic 
Logic”, vol. 11, n. 2, (2005), pp. 194-206; D.A. MARTIN, Gödel’s Conceptual Realism, “The 
Symbolic Logic”, vol. 11, n. 2, (2205), pp. 207-224; D. CHIFFI, Kurt Gödel, Philosophical 
explorations, Aracne Ed., Roma 2012 and R. BRUNI, Kurt Gödel, un profilo, Carocci Ed., 
Roma 2015. A separate mention can be made for P. CASSOU-NOGUÈS, I demoni di Gödel. 
Logica e follia, trad. it., B. Mondadori, Milano 2008, which illustrates what is called ‘fantastic 
metaphysics’, the relationship between ‘madness and logic’ which helps to understand the 
various obsessions of Gödel, who was fascinated by esoteric questions.  
41 Cf. also the essays on the relationship between relativity and Kantian philosophy at the end 
of the 1940s (ibid., 247-259), that give an idea of the Kantian origins of his thinking, as is in-
deed confirmed in a letter written in response to a questionnaire sent to him by a PhD sociolo-
gy student: “only Kant has had any influence on my philosophical thought in general”. See 
cfr. K. GÖDEL, Collected Works, Volume IV: Selected Correspondance A-G, Oxford Universi-
ty Press, Oxford 2013, p. 297.  
42 The figures of Suzanne Bachelard and Jean Desanti must be kept in mind at the end of the 
1950s, at least for France. They engaged themselves with Husserlian thought to find a differ-
ent path from the so-called Standard philosophy of science, they were reaching for a ‘phe-
nomenological epistemology’ of mathematics; cf. S. BACHELARD, La conscience de rational-
ité, P.U.F., Paris 1958 and J. DESANTI, Les idéalités mathématiques, Le Seuil, Paris 1968 and 
on these two figures cfr. Razionalismi senza dogmi, chap. V e Epistemologia debole, Bertani, 
Verona 1986, chap. II. 
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It could be said that Gödel practised from the beginning of his career 
that approach which Bachelard called in La Philosophie du non ‘the philoso-
phy of why not?’, that is the need for science in general to go beyond already 
established knowledge, to think of alternative possibilities through the met-
amathematical gaze that lies outside of any specific sector, that which later 
Gregory Chaitin will define as “a wonderful metamathematical result. Met-
amathematical because it is not a mathematic result, rather it is a theorum 
about mathematics itself, about the limits of mathematic methods”43. In this 
way the critical point of view was used heuristically as a precondition of the 
theorum of incompleteness, through the awareness of the non-exhaustive 
value of Hilbert’s hypothesis on the completeness and the demonstrability of 
formal systems. All this allowed Gödel to dialecticize in Bachelardian terms 
the available material of the work of logic, that is to vary the syntactic scope 
of the liars paradox, to problematize it and to put into practice les Méthodes 
nouvelles, about which Henri Poincaré spoke, that lead to negative results. In 
saying ‘no’ in the Bachelardian sense one arrives systematically at setting 
some limits and revealing the instruments needed to reactivate on new bases 
the procedures and the techniques that lead to the establishment of a new 
field, more delimited and at the same time more precise. Gödel made of the 
reflexive moment an indispensable instrument for thinking of a different 
form of the construction of objectivity; to use an expression of Yehuda 
Elkana, it can be said that he accomplished a “scientific revolution as a revo-
lution in reflexivity”44. This awareness becomes more apparent in his essays 
of the 50’s and 60’s, and it almost brings him to perceive in his theorems an 
‘epistemological break’, inasmuch as they are carriers of a nouvel esprit sci-
entifique, even if he sometimes makes these implications appear only like 
some nuances, because he believes, as Bachelard himself on many occasions 
had emphasised45, that the philosophical reflexion on these theorems is struc-
turally delayed. 
                       
43 G. CHAITIN, Alla ricerca di omega, (2005), trad. it., Adelphi, Milano 2007, p. 34. 
44 Cf. Y. ELKANA, La rivoluzione scientifica come rivoluzione nella scientificità, in A. LA 
VERGATA-A. PAGNINI, Storia della filosofia. Storia della scienza. Saggi in onore di Paolo 
Rossi, La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1995, pp. 23-35. 
45 This also explains his difficulties in publishing these writings, in subjecting them to contin-
uous verification, and similarly the fact of refusing to participate for example in a more philo-
sophical relationship with the Entretiens de Zürich sur les fondements et la méthode des sci-
ences mathématiques, organised in 1938 by Ferdinand Gonseth who, through Paul Bernays, 
had officially invited him, as is clear from Gödel’s letter of sent to Gonseth on the 7th Novem-
ber to thank him for the invite, where among other things Gödel communicates being about to 
conclude the demonstration of Cantor’s continuum hypothesis. (We have the Director of 
Losanna Library, where the Gonseth fund has still been little explored, to thank for having 
delivered the letter). This Entretien was formed in the December of 1938 with the objective of 
beginning to think about a different model to that Standard of the philosophy of mathematics, 
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In the Nachlass and in various letters of late Gödel, and in that which is 
called his ‘philosophical stage’46, we can find this need that translates into a 
real path, even though it might not be linear but instead subject to and rid-
dled with various changes of mind. This path is aimed at laying the founda-
tion for a difference philosophical image of mathematics, not reducible to 
the canon of those images current at that time. Gödel was conscious of some 
new nuances implicit in his results, but he was also conscious that these nu-
ances were in need of a different theoretical platform to be able to be cor-
rectly understood. One nuance that, thanks to his direct philosophical com-
mitment, he tried hard to clarify, and that he felt would not be well 
metabolised by the philosophic-scientific environment, was the idea, of 
which his theorems were the expression, that the truth of mathematical utter-
ances and axioms did not coincide with their demonstrability. At the same 
time this required an epistemological attitude that in Bachelardian terms can 
be defined as mobile, in virtue of the fact that their contents by nature are 
always on the point of being an object of continual revision. Hence comes 
the epistemic realization of the insufficiency of those ‘fashionable’ positions 
that considered exclusively their stability and aimed at the absolute self-
foundation of the system of knowledge, and the warning that in fact those 
positions could even constitute some ‘epistemological obstacles’ for an ade-
quate comprehension of the contents of mathematics because the problem 
concerning the nature of mathematics, considered crucial by Gödel, was not 
seen in its proper dimension. 
A Bachelardian reading of these essays first and foremost helps us to 
better understand Gödel’s efforts aimed at claiming for the mathematical 
corpus an objectivity not reducible only to the formal-constructivist aspect, 
as well as his continuous insistence on the ‘highly transfinite concept of ob-
jective mathematical truth’, derived from the results of incompleteness and 
undefinability. At the same time a Bachelardian reading allows us to see in a 
different light the constant critiques to conventionalist visions contained in 
these Gödel’s essays, which, not by chance and in many places, in a way 
similar to Bachelard’s, emphasize the particular character of mathematics: its 
producing ‘contents’, its not being a ‘language’, as it is repeated and high-
lighted with diverse arguments in the six versions of his tormented essay Is 
                                                      
as it was emerging on the basis of some results among which were Gödel’s, who was invited 
precisely for this reason. Among the participants were Bernays, F. Enriques, M. Frechet, J. 
Jorgensen, H. Lebesgue, J. Lukasiewicz, G. Polya, Th. Skolem and others such as Ackerman, 
Brouwer, Gentzen, Heyting and von Neumann who for various reasons could not participate. 
cf. F. GONSETH, Les Entretiens de Zürich sur les fondements et la méthode des sciences 
mathématiques, A. Leeman, Zürich 1941. 
46 F. RODRIGUEZ-CONSUEGRA, Un inédito de Gödel contra el convencionalismo: historia, 
anàlisis, contexto y traduction, cit. 
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mathematics syntax of language? All this leads to the powerful idea that 
mathematics produces true knowledge, always approchées and inachevées, 
which is incomplete; at the same time the idea emerges that there exists a 
close analogy between mathematics and theoretical physics, which formalist 
visions, considered in Winter’s terms as undue ‘metaextensions’ of a deter-
mined scientific doctrine of the time, did not emphasize enough.47 
Already Albert Lautman in the late ‘30s, thanks to his critical analysis of 
the theorems of incompleteness, warned of the fact that the philosophies of 
mathematics of that time were very insufficient, and that they offered a spec-
tacle, to say the least, “décevant”; he went so far as to delineate the need for 
a real ‘resistance’48 against that which Gödel defined as ‘nominalistic phi-
losophies of mathematics’ of a positivistic derivation in their different varia-
bles, starting with the contemporary, conventionalist positions. 
These results, far from being considered, as Jean-Yves Girard would 
say, “the anti-scientist panacea”49, pose a fundamental question concerning 
the nature of mathematical knowledge, in highlighting the necessity to go 
beyond the formal-syntactic vision; furthermore, they introduce the idea of a 
particular role being given to the intuition which assumes, to use another 
Bachelardian term, the physiognomy of an intuition travaillée et mobile in 
its allowing access to mathematical objectivity and in its bringing to light the 
non-autonomy of logic; this because in order to be productive logic must be 
engaged, as will be said with rare theoretical sensitivity by Hélène Metzger 
in her original studies of the history of science50.The non-autonomy of logic 
                       
47 We can say that in these essays of Gödel there breathes a Bachelardian air, almost familiar, 
with points of view and thematics which make an integral part of every discourse of every 
authentic philosophy of mathematics and of science in general. As Vincent Bontems says, 
even if in Bachelard there is not a single reference to Gödel and his theorems, because already 
from his first writings that emerged in the 1930s there was a severe criticism of all those at-
tempts which tended towards the absolute auto-foundation of a system of knowledge, his vi-
sion, as far as it concerns logic, can be interpreted in the light of the successive works of Paul 
Cohen on forcing. cf. V. Bontems, À la pointe du rationalisme. Introduction to Gaston 
Bachelard et l’avenir de la culture, cit. 
48 A. LAUTMAN, La matematica come resistenza, cit. 
49 J.Y. GIRARD, Le Point aveugle. Cours de logique. Vers la perfection, Hermann, Paris 2006, 
p. 30; in the first part of this volume we can find discussed the logical-philosophical sense of 
the idea of incompleteness. Linear logic, proposed in the ‘80s by Girard, could be considered 
a development of some points of the Gödelian path, starting from the critique of that which is 
called ‘the formalist ideology’ and from putting at the centre the question of the non-
autonomy of logic. It must be emphasised that in the French world the question of the non-
autonomy of logic has been at the centre of constant reflexion and heated debate starting from 
the foundation of the ‘Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale’. 
50 Cf. H. METZGER, Il metodo filosofico nella storia delle scienze, in F. ENRIQUES-H. 
METZGER, Storia e struttura del pensiero scientifico, tr. it. by M. Castellana, Barbieri-
Selvaggi Ed., Manduria 2014, p. 69. 
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is another culmination of the heuristic use of Gödel’s methodology focused 
on “negative results”, but it requires a not inconsiderable reflexive effort to 
be adequately understood as a real ‘epistemological rupture’, first and fore-
most in combating the static and conventionalist visions of mathematical 
thought, grafted onto which logic finds its reason for being and the produc-
tivity of its important procedures. 
Within such a context, or ‘topology of the problematic’, Gödel’s desire – 
to classify the philosophies of mathematics in order to reform the very same 
mathematics starting from its own concepts – acquires greater meaning. One 
among these concepts is for example the ‘set’. In the 1961 essay The modern 
development of the foundations of mathematics in the light of philosophy he 
describes, in the words of the curators of his Nachlass, “in philosophical 
terms the development of the study of the foundations of mathematics in our 
century and fit it into a general scheme of possible philosophical Weltan-
schauungen”51.  
Analogically to the Bachelardian philosophical topology, even if in a hori-
zontal sense rather than a vertical, Gödel offers us a double topology: that of 
the “possible conceptions of the world” and that more relative to the differ-
ent philosophies. One could attempt therefore to topologize first that which 
he calls the “general scheme” that includes “two groups”, one on the left and 
the other on the right. On both sides there are those which could be called 
large conceptual containers of visions of the world on the basis “of their af-
finity toor, respectively, turning away from metaphysics (or religion)”52; this 
scale could therefore be arranged in a horizontally rather than vertically.  
 
[spiritualism] [idealism] [theology]                [skepticism] [materialism] [positivism] 
 
Such a scheme is considered useful heuristically and at the same time 
“fruitful for the analysis of philosophical doctrines” that have as their specif-
ic object the theory of knowledge; but Gödel is not content with this first 
‘scheme’ and proposes another to complete it: “Thus one would, say that 
apriorism belongs in principle on the right and empiricism on the left sides”, 
and at the same time “optimism belongs in principles toward the right and 
pessimism toward the left”53. The scheme can therefore continue to be repre-
sented in a horizontal fashion: mathematics goes on the right, because by na-
ture it is considered an a priori science.  
 
                       
51 Cf. D. Føllesdal, in K. GÖDEL, Collected Works, Volume 3, cit., p. 364; refer to this Nota 
for the analysis and comment on his thought. 
52 K. GÖDEL, The modern development of the foundations of mathematics in the light of phi-
losophy, p. 375. 
53 Ibidem, p. 377. 
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[apriorism] [optimism]                                                     [empiricism] [pessimism] 
 
But starting from the philosophy of the Renaissance another Zeitgeist 
came to oppose such an aprioristic vision of the right, a Zeitgeist which 
pointed out the empiric aspect of mathematics. This has resulted in a notable 
development of its abstract capacities and of studies concerning its funda-
mentals. But in the late 19th century a series of new developments, like the 
antinomies of set theory, made their appearance, causing the aprioristic posi-
tion to slip towards empiricist positions to the point of denying that “mathe-
matics, as it had developed previously, represents a system of truths.” Faced 
with “these nihilistic consequences” that find their reasoning in the “spirit of 
the time”, in the mathematical field there was a reaction that was concretized 
in the project of Hilbert, which is “that curious hermaphroditic thing that 
Hilbert’s formalism represents, which sought to do justice both the spirit of 
the time and to the nature of mathematics.”54 But Gödel considered this Hil-
bertian mediation impossible because the problems posed by the two tradi-
tional positions of the left and right lead to inevitable overlapping and so to 
evident contradictions: “one must either give up the old rightward aspects of 
mathematics or attempt to uphold them in contradiction to the spirit of the 
time. Obvious the first course is the only one that suits our time and [is] 
therefore also the one usually adopted. One should, however, keep in mind 
that this is a purely negative attitude.”55 
For this reason Gödel deems it necessary to embark on a new way, keep-
ing in mind the “advances… are due just to this left-ward spirit in philoso-
phy and world-view”, progress in part due to the “excesses” and the “wrong 
direction of the preceding rightward philosophy”. While preferring the right, 
as has been underlined by many, Gödel considers it necessary to find a me-
dian “the correct attitude appears to me to be that the truth lies in the middle 
or consists of a combination of the two conceptions”56. Bachelard in his to-
pology had indicated in the ‘applied Rationalism’ and in the ‘rational Mate-
rialism’ his median or dialogued way of evaluating the epistemic value of 
philosophical theories and their degree of distance from the nouvel esprit 
scientifique. Similarly, Gödel, demonstrating himself to be always faithful to 
the heuristic principle of the objective mathematical truth, advances a more 
concrete proposal that passes from the real contents of a theory to identifying 
the underlying problems that the work of mathematics entails. Instead of 
founding the certainty of mathematics, it is necessary to construct it, as 
Bachelard said. Then, one can “by cultivating (deepening) knowledge of the 
                       
54 Ibid., p. 379. 
55 Ibid., p. 381. 
56 Ibidem. 
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abstract systems, and themselves which to the setting up of these mechanical 
systems, and fur their by seeking, according to the same procedures, to gain 
insights into the can solvability, and the methods for the solution, of all 
meaningful mathematical problems… The procedure must thus consist, at 
least to a large extent, in a clarification of meaning that does not consist in 
giving definitions”57. 
If Bachelard and Gödel both came to propose two respective and origi-
nal philosophical topologies, this is the result of the need to delineate the 
outlines of a philosophical strategy able to bring out that emerging novum in 
the complexity of scientific research which the theoretical methods of their 
time were not able to grasp. But as Hermann Weyl said in Raum-Zeit-
Materie in 1918, “the first thing to do is to comprehend this fact: despite the 
oscillations of philosophy from system to system and all its slips, we must 
not give up this quest, because otherwise knowledge will become incompre-
hensible chaos.”58 The two proposed topologies fully respond to this need 
and as such must be reconsidered because, perhaps still today, they have 
something to tell us, we who live and act “in the ungrateful land of the phi-
losophy of science”, as Jean Cavaillès defined it in a letter to his friend Al-
bert Lautman59. 
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